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Stalemate in Technology, 1925-1935:
The Interplay of Stagnation and Innovation
Real-Economic Stagnation
In the last few years, as the economic crisis has progressed "from Stagflation to
slumpflation" (Professor Müton Friedman in his Nobel Lecture), there has been renewed
interest in crisis theory and empirical studies on the Stagnation in the 1930's; and who did
best in economic forecasting? He who dared to venture into using the KondratiefFcycle for
projecting the decreasing growth rates of consumption, investment, employment, and
production.
Simüarly, at first sight, but profoundly different from the Kondratieff model, is the
metamorphosis model ofthe interplay ofStagnation and innovation1, with the help ofwhich
we shaU try to explain the real-economic, long-term, evolutionary change in the industry
structure of developed nations. Without committing the foUy of monocausality, but for the
sake of stressing the significant explanatory power of what Schumpeter caüed the
(evolutionary) "Process of Creative Destruction"2, we propose that most of the in-
equilibrium trends, and specificaUy - the shifts in trend, which have been observed during
and since the Industrial Revolution3, can be traced to changes in the rate and direction of
technological innovation.
Our proposition requires first the distinction of types of industrial innovations and then
makes Statements of the relative order of magnitude of these types of change over time.
P1: Technological basic innovations create new markets and new industrial branches.
And basic innovations occur in Clusters (see Figure 1).
P2: Improvement innovations in established industrial branches occur in series.
And the improvement effect of successive improvement innovations is governed by
1 Mensch, Gerhard, Stalemate in Technology, Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger 1979.
2 Schumpeter, Joseph A., Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York: Harper & Row, 1942.
3 Freudenberger, Herman, und Mensch, Gerhard, Von derProvinzstadt zur Industrieregion, Ein Beitrag zur Po¬
litökonomie der Sozialinnovation, dargestellt am Innovationsschub der Industriellen Revolution im Räume
Brunn, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975.
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a law offirst increasing and then diminishing marginal return to the suppher; and for
the user it is governed by a law of first increasing and then diminishing marginal
utüity.
Figure 1:
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Source: Mensch, G., Das technologische Pattta.a.Ö.
Consequently, as a corollary of P 1 and P 2, and under the assumption that the diffusion of
innovation in many growth sectors is interrelated by a "Veblen Effect" (that is, by technical
complementarity or psychological complementarity via reference groups), we may conjec-
ture: There should be a phase in industrial development in which many sectors of the
economy simultaneously suffer from Stagnation, which is the Joint effect of diminishing
marginal returns and of diminishing marginal Utility attached to that group of goods and
Services which have become the reference items for an affluent society.
This phase in the industrial evolution, which is often attempted to be partiaUy explained
by theories of overproduction, underinvestment, underconsumption, overconcentration,
and underemployment, is calied "Stalemate in Technology". It begins when many lines of
business based on mature technologies turn stagnant, capital withdraws from it but cannot
(temporarüy) find profitable reinvestment opportunities in new types of technology, and
while Stagflation indicates structural readiness for radical innovations, these don't emerge
instantly, don't come in the right time and place, and don't "fall from the sky" in the most
convenient quantity and quality. EventuaUy, the mounting need for innovation produces a
sweU of basic innovations, and that highlights the recovery and puts an end to the
stalemated Situation.
Thus, there is a real-economic, circular phenomenon PI - P2 - PI- P2 underneath the
secular trends in production and prices. There is a pattern in structural change which
characterizes the process of creative destruction. Even ifthere were not the weU-known and
often discussed methodological flaws in describing this structural change as "secular
trends in production and prices", these indicators, since they are Symptoms, wül never be
powerful indicators of the underlying phenomenon: Imbalanced technological change. "In
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analyzing history, do not be too profound, for often the causes are quite superficial", Emer¬
son wrote. In this sense ofobviousness, much of this pattern of structural change is caused
by and is the after-effect of Clusters of basic innovations. Thus, the Stagnation in the 1920's
is to a large extent due to (temporary) maturation oftechnology that came into practice in a
clustering fashion in the decade around 1886; and the wheel turned with the emergence of
another Cluster of basic innovations and the swell of brand new technology, which, in the
years around 1935, appeared on the scene en mass: New means of transportation and
related technology (helicopters, 1936, rockets, 1935, diesel-locomotives, 1934, jet engines,
1941, and many supporting innovations as the radar, 1934, hydramatic transmissions,
1939, hydrauhc clutches, 1937, power steering, 1930, catalytic petrol cracking, 1935, no-
knock gasoline, 1935); new means of communication and related technology (TV, 1936,
magnetic taperecording, 1937, Kodachrome, 1935); new materials (plexiglas, 1935,
neoprene, 1931, nylon, 1938, wrinkle-free fabrics, 1932, titanium, 1937), and, of course,
new weapons.
Basic Innovation and Industrial Evolution
Rather than understanding the Stagnation of 1925-1935 and the great Depression as ac-
cident in the regulär course of economic history, we suggest to view it as a regulär
phenomenon occurring in due course of industrial evolution. Stagnation of growth in old
branches of industry and the genesis of new branches seem to have some "seasonal"
dynamic which spans periods oftwo human generations or so (the Metamorphosis Model).
This thought is reflected in Simon Kuznets' definition of an epochal innovation, that
"may be described as a major addition to the stock ofhuman knowledge which provides a
potential for sustained economic growth - an addition so major that its exploitation and
utilization absorb the energies of human societies and dominate their growth for a period
long enough to constitute an epoch in economic history"4. Stagnation, then, is the
"natural" autumn after the summer's rieh harvest, and in this sense, the 1920s may have
been the faU of the epoch that began with the Cluster of basic innovations in electricity,
chemistry and other industrial sectors in the years around 1886.
Apparently, Alfred Chandler was the first to use the term "basic innovations", and the
way he uses that term sheds hght on our Suggestion that the Great Depression was a
"natural" (but may be unnecessarüy harsh) "season" in the regulär course of industrial
evolution in the period after the "Great Depression of the 1880s"5. Chandler refers to the
changes during the 20 to 25 years before 1903". In that period, the basic innovations were
more in the creation of new forms of Organization and new ways of marketing. The great
modern corporation, carrying on the major industrial processes, namely, purchasing, and
often production of materials and parts, manufacturing, marketing and finance - all within
the same organizational structure - had its beginnings in that period. Such organizations
hardly existed, outside of the raüroads, before the 1880s. By 1900 they had become the
basic business unit in American Industry"6.
4 Kuznets, Simon, Modern Economic Growth, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966, 6th ed. 1973, p. 2.
5 Rosenberg, Hans, Große Depression und Bismarckzeit, Berlin: DeGruyter, 1967.
6 Chandler, Alfred, The Beginnings of "Big Business" in American Industry, in: Business History Review, 23
(1959), p. 1-31.
62
We find it hard to believe that this powerful business structure could have been pushed
into stagnant Performance in the 1920s and subdued to depressed behavior m the 1930s by
any kind of monetary policy; only endogenous factors - structural inflexibüity and offering
less wanted goods and Services to the public seem to us promising lines ofinvestigation into
the causes of the structural crisis 1925-35. These factors we shall now deal with briefly.
"Did Monetary Factors Cause the Great Depression?"
This question, the title of a recent book by Peter Temin7, is now in place, as the monetarist's
supposition is the nullhypothesis to our proposition. Temin, looking again into the
monetary records of the United States, concluded from his study: "The proposition that
monetary forces caused the Depression must be rejected." For two reasons: "Firstly, if
there had been deflationary monetary pressure, it would have to be visible in the financial
markets", which it was not. "Secondly, although the nominal stock of money feU in 1930
and 1931, prices feil also ... If the fall in the nominal stock of money was deflationary,
prices were sufficiently flexible to absorb this pressure".
Underinvestment? Underconsumption!
Although the theory of vanishing investment opportunities (of A. Hansen, et al.), iftaken as
a temporal phenomenon of (know-how) factor immobüity and frictional labor and capital
unemployment, is very much in line with our proposition of technological stalemate, it does
not really seem to explain the Stagnation and depression in the period 1925-35. At least; in
the US, firms kept investing in traditional, low profit sectors - having no better alternatives
at hand than very risky paper investments, as the opportunities for investment in profitable
new technologies did not emerge for a while in sufficient volume. In Germany, by contrast,
private net investment feil below zero, disinvestment outweighing expenditures for new
plant and machinery. Thus, in the US, "The Depression was not caused by a dramatic
collapse of investment" (Temin), and in Germany, the fall of investment was rather the
effect than the. cause of depressive circumstances.
According to our understanding of the underlying structural crisis, investment was
sluggish as a result of stagnant consumers' demand, which was caused by a mismatch of
quality of supply and shifted needs ofthe people. This view accords with Temin's, who con¬
cluded:
"At the current State of our knowledge, the unexplained fall in consumption is larger than the part we can explain
(by monetary factors, G.M.), but the magnitude of the total fall is incontrovertible. The large decline in consump¬
tion expenditures for both durable and nondurable goods in 1930 had a profoundly depressing effect for the econ¬
omy"8.
Sharing the opinion of Peter Temin, we cannot for example agree with Gottfried Haberler,
who attests to "the overwhelming importance of the monetary factor" in his 1976 paper on
"The World Economy, Money, and the Great Depression 1919-1939". Our conjecture is,
7 Temin, Peter, Did Monetary Factors Cause the Great Depression?, New York: Norton & Co., 1976.
8 Temin, Peter, Monetary Factors, p. 172.
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that in the 1920s, as in the decade between 1966 and 1975, structural reasons have caused
consumer's abstinence more than anything eise. If the presence teaches something for un¬
derstanding history, for which the pertinent data is unavaüable, why not look at recent
events:
1. The Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment in the US between 1956 and 1975 rose
steadüy up to 1966 = 100. Then it dwindled down to 40 by 1970 and feU - with a short
upswing 1971 and 1972 - as deeply as below 10 by 1975. (The law of diminishing
marginal Utility governing demand for mass-produced consumer goods in satiated
markets; proposition P2.)
2. Between 1968 and 1974, aU consumer goods twice tested by the Stiftung Warentest in
Germany have been checked for quality improvements (functional innovations); of the
66 product groups that had been tested at least twice, comparison shows that in two-
thirds of the product groups there was no functional improvement (the new thing does
no more for the user than the older vintage model did); only in one-third ofthe consumer
goods was there an inducement to switch to the newest thing. (The law of diminishing
marginal return governs supply of innovation in mass-produced goods and Services in
technologicaUy mature markets; again proposition P2.)
Clearly, these structural reasons for wait and see and not buy came long before the crisis of
1973, which is the entry point of the monetarist hypothesis that the go slow on buying con¬
sumer goods was caused by job insecurity, shortage of disposable income, and other signs
of crisis. In fact, the unfavorable consumer sentiment reached back to the super-boom of
1967 and 68; a pattern which might weU provide an analogy for the causes of the fall in con¬
sumption before and during the Great Depression 1925-35.
Therefore, the underinvestment theory is weak if it is based on lack of finance due to a
shortage of investable money. It can be strengthened if based on lack of profitable in¬
vestment projects given large capacities in traditional lines of business, satiated demand in
those markets, low rates of capacity utilization, on one side, and the unfulfiUed desire ofthe
people to buy something eise than offered in gracious plenty.
The Imbalanced-Technical-Change-Hypothesis (ITCH)
learning from recent events, when data is available, and formulating a conjecture about
how it might have been in the twenties, when the data is unavaüable we proceed to the Im-
balanced-Technical-Change-Hypothesis (ITCH).
It buüds on a further distinction between types of innovative investment projects:
Type E: (expansionary innovations)
product innovations or service innovations, which by their improvement effect
(in price or quality) mobihze potential demand for consumer goods and Ser¬
vices; private and/or public;
Type R: (rationalizing innovations)
process, product or service innovations in capital goods producing sectors of
the economy, where by their improvement effect they aUow for a more efficient
use of raw materials, manpower, and other cost factors.
WhÜe our proposition P2 says, that the intrasectoral sequence of innovations will even¬
tuaUy offer less and less attractive change opportunities for producers and users, our im-
balanced-technical-change-hypothesis is a cross-sectional Statement and says:
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P3: The ratio of expansionary innovations and rationalizing innovations changes over
time.
(A) A Cluster of basic innovations makes the E/R ratio step up;
(B) As the series ofimprovement innovations run their course, the E/R ratio goes down.
The last sentence (B) clearly is compatible with the "capital theory of technological
progress", which holds the labor-cost saving motive responsible for the direction of
technical change; however, this theory is clearly in contradiction with the sentence (A). As
the reswitching debate goes in capital theory, it fails to grasp the point that high wages and
low interests don't induce reswitching to older (more labor intensive) technologies but in-
duce the propensity to switch to brand new, radically different technologies: basic in¬
novations. And the critical aspect of this reallocation problem is the temporary un-
avaüablihty of safe, useful, agreeable new technologies.
Summarizing our propositions, we suggest that Stagnation in industry, in the last decade,
is, and in 1920s probably was, caused by a sluggish rate of reaUy useful and profitable im¬
provement innovations which, furthermore, went too far into the cost and labor saving
direction and too slowly into the Utility and labor augmenting direction.
Next, we present some data for illustrating the conjecture. And then, assuming this con-
jecture to be vahd, we show by means ofthe mathematics ofcatastrophy theory that such a
sluggish and disequilibrating rate and composition of "progress" produces structural in¬
stability, implies a considerable probability of breakdown, and produces structural
readiness for basic innovations, and recovery along rather different lines of enterprise.
Imbalanced Technological Change Analysis
Ever since Ricardo expressed it in his famous chapter "On Machines", the ITCH-
hypothesis has emerged, submerged and reemerged as economic history ran its course. In
periods of "distress" (as they said in Ricardo's times), technological change has always
been blamed for its labor savüig effects; only in good times was it ä la mode to speak of
various ways by which innovation may be classified as "neutral". If occasionaüy as in
FeUner's articie on the direction of innovation, the possibüity of an imbalanced
technological "progress" was discussed:
- "... a high rate of innovation could not continue for very long if it became associated
with a sufficiently pronounced maldistribution of the factor-saving effects".
- "We are, I believe, living m an era of accelerated innovation, and such an era could
become one of increasingly pronounced difficulties as a result of the overshooting of the
labor-saving or of the capital-saving effect"9.
The possibility of it having a lasting effect on the economy and society was quickly dis-
carded as highly unlikely:
- "But... I believe that in this regard economic theory supports optimistic views much
more nearly than pessimistic ones"10.
9 Feller, William, Profit Maximization, Utility Maximization, and the Rate and Direction ofInnovation, in:
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. LVI (1966), pp. 24-32.
10 Fellner, William, Profit Maximization, p. 32.
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Imbalanced Technological Change and Stagnation: Empirical Evidence
The ITCH-hypothesis with respect to series of improvement innovations (proposition
P3, sentence 'B') has found strong support in the findings of the "Science-Indicator-
Group", in which one of the authors participated. Classifying 322 improvement in¬
novations which happened in the period 1952-1973 according to E-Type and R-Type,
we found a somewhat even flow of expansionary umovations coupled with a rising tide
of rationalizing innovations in this period (Table i). Thus, the expansionary effect of
demand-inducing innovations was more and more offset by the factor-saving effect ofR-
type innovations, with obvious consequences to macro-economic growth: it stagnated.
Tablel:
Period Type of Innovation
E/R
Expansionary rationalizing
1952 - 54 29 36
.541955
- 59 8 33
196o - 64 18 44 .41
1965 - 69 12 55 .22
197o - 73 17 7o .24
TOTAL 84 238
In Germany, real mdustrial growth between 1970 and 1976 was only 2 percent, but it
was achieved with a labor force that shrank by 13 % as the ratio of E/R - investments in
Germany (measured by the Ifo-Test) dropped significantly. Between 1970 and 1976, the
proportion of E-type investments went down from 55% (1970) to 18% (1976), whereas
the proportion of R-type investments went up from 33 % to 57 %. The observed shifts in
the investment structure are highly correlated to the observed shifts in the mix of in¬
novations. This data üluminates the interplay between innovation and Stagnation. By
analogy, we conjecture that the same interplay existed in the 1920s and produced struc¬
tural instability and structural readiness for E-type innovation in the 1930s.
Imbalanced Technological Change and Structural Instabüity: Analysis
There is a rather direct way to test the ITCH. The procedure is explained in Figure 2.
One can depict the input of investment capital (I) and the input of labor hours (A) by a
string of points (A, I) over time. Over time, for the period 1950-1976, this string of points
forms a spiral. This pattern we found for German data to hold even under regional and
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Figure 2; Workhour- and Investment-Input in Industrial Sectors
Average
annual
workhour
input
E
//
//
/
R
I = Investment input
per year
sectoral disaggregation; and this spiralling pattern also holds for US-data 1900 to 1941
(see Figure 3).
We may assume that all the technological and organizational innovations which were
embodied by the stream of investments have guided the (A, I) path into the spiraling
pattern, whereby in the upswing periods the effect of E-type innovations and investments
outweigh the effect of R-type innovations and investments. E und R may be considered
the "control variables" in the process of structural change of the industrial apparatus.
These "controls" or "guidances" as can be seen from Figure 2, operate such that E is
proportionale to A and I while R is proportionate to I but disproportional (laborsaving)
to Ä. Thus, we obtain simple linear rules for transformation of coordinates:
E(A,i) = p,A+qii + e
R(A,I) = p2A+q2l + r
where pi (d), p2 (d), qi (a), q2 (a) are all sinus-cosins-functions of the degree of turn¬
ing (a) and e and r are the trans locations of the origin (0,0). For the best fitting degree of
turning (a = 38°) and e = 0 and r = 1, we obtain E (A, I) and R (A, I) as given in
Table 2.
The computed E/R-ratio given in the Table 2 reveals: during the 3 decades prior to the
crisis 1929/1930, and with the only exception of the pre-war boom of müitary contract
work, the E/R-ratio went down. If the expansionary period 1900-1916 must be con¬
sidered balanced by a E/R-ratio in the order of magnitude 30, the war period is
characterized by bringing the E/R-ratio down to a fourth ofthat value, whereas the drop
to about one-tenth of the original magnitude must be taken as a sign of too few expan¬
sionary and too many rationalizing innovations in the decade before 1930.
By analogy, again: The E/R-indicator for imbalanced technological change in the period
1950-1976 performs weh: We found a high correlation of the E/R-ratio computed from E
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Table 2: USA 1900-1934
i INVESTMENT AND LABOR INPUTS GUIDED BY E- and R-TYPE INNOVATION
Year A I E R E/R Average E/R
! 1900 2,83 1,22 3,03 0,18 16,83
01 3,07 1,30 3,22 0,13 24,76
02 3-31 1,49 3,52 0,13 27,07
03 3,40 1,44 3,57 0,04 89,25
04 3,22 1,39 3,40 0,11 30,90 37,8
05 3,50 1,57 3,73 0,09 41,44
06 3,73 1,91 4,12 0,21 19,61
07 3,78 2,11 4,28 0,33 12,96
08 3,35 1,82 3,76 0,37 10,16
09 3,90 1,99 4,30 0,17 25,29 21,9
1 1910 4,01 2,04 4,42 0,14 31,5
i U 4,04 1,94 4,37 0,04 109,2
12 4,26 2,15 4,68 0,07 66,85
13 4,3B 2,38 4,92 0,18 27,33
14 4,05 2,04 4,45 0,12 37,08 54,4
15 4,00 2,01 4,39 0,12 36,58
16 4,65 2,62 5,27 0,20 26,35
17 4,74 3,05 5,61 0,48 11,69
i 18 4,79 3,21 5,75 0,68 8,45
19 4,95 3,70 6,18 0,86 7,18 18, o5
i 1920 5,07 4,77 6,93 1,64 4,22
21 3,56 2,95 4,63 1,13 4,09
22 ! 4,03 3,56 5,36 1,33 4,03
23 4,70 4,64 6,56 1,77 3,70
24 4,22 4,46 6,06 l,ai 3,17 3,8
25 4,42 4,95 6,53 2,19 2,99
26 4,57 5,11 6,75 2,22 3.04
27 4,49 4,84 6,52 2,05 3,18
28 4,41 4,79 6,42 2,06 3,11
29 4,73 5,60 7,17 2,50 2,86 3,o
! 1930 4,02 4,37 5,86 1,97 2,97
| 31 3,30 2,75 4,29 1,13 3,79
1 32 2,65 1,56 3,05 0,60 5,08
| 33 2,81 1,53 3,15 0,48 6,56
34 2,94 2,20 3,67 0.,92 3,99 4,5
Legend: A = Average weekly working hours of employees
Q
in manufacturing (in 1o man hours)
Source: Historical Statistics USA, Series D 13o,
D 8o3, D 765
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I = Private domestic investment in producers
durable equipment (in 1o /current/prices)
Source: Historical Statistics USA, F 56,
ab 1929 eigene Berechnungen vgl. Series P 299
(A, I), R (A, I) and the E/R-ratio observed from the huge sample of innovations. Thus, we
assume, for the period 1900-1934 simüar E/R-ratios would be observable if one only
would coüect sufficiently many cases, which is not impossible but impractical.
For the time being, we may judge the ITCH-phenomenon weü testified by the calculated
E/R-ratio. Ergo: The Imbalanced Technological Change Hypothesis explains the Stagna¬
tion trend observed in the years before 1929/30.
a) A Model of Systems Breakdown
If the socio-economic system is gradually changed by some rate of innovation, the
system becomes more and more structurally unstable if the direction of innovation is
systematicaUy imbalanced by a low E/R-Ratio.
Table 3: E/R-ratio 1800-1950
P e r t o d
BASIC
Innovat.
1
ratio of E-expan
1
2
sionary to R rationalizing
3asic - Innovation
3 1 4
1 18oo - 185o 21
total period two periods
18oo - 135o
13 E : 8 R
before 1825
4 E : SR
after 1825
9 E : 3 R
2 185o - 19oo
Electrotechnical
Industry
22 185o - 19oo
11 E : 11 R
before 1876
3 E : 3 R
after 1876
8 E : 8 R
3 185o - 19oo
Chemical Industry
28 185o - 19oo
17 E : 11 R
5 E : 6 R 12 E : 5 R
4
185o - 19oo
Total of 3 and 4
5o 28 E : 22 R 8 E : 9 R 2o E : 13 R
5 19oo - 195o 5o
19oo - 195o
25 E : 25 R
before 1925
5 E : 8 R
after 1925
2o E : 17 R
Source: All basir innovations published in G. Mensch, Das technologische Patt,
Frankfurt 1975, have been classified in E-type ("exponsionary") and
R-type ("rationalizing") by a team of 12 collegues at the International
Institute of Mangagement, Berlin, whom we are grateful to for their help.
This can be easüy demonstrated by choosing a type of production function P (A, I) which
aüows for turning points to occur. We find such a production function on the assumptions
that-
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1) production (P) ist the output of some maximizing process operating within the boun¬
daries of the current production potential V (P, I, A), and
2) both this potential V and the effective output P are dependent on inputs I and A which
in tum are prearranged for by E-and R-type innovative investments.
By Taylor expansion of V about P, I, A, where P is both the disposition variable, and an
output parameter, I and A are input parameters, we obtain
V (P, I, A) = 1/4 P.P3 + 1/2 IP2 + AP + constant
Under maximization, if the disposition variable P is used to measure the maximal produc¬
tion given at any time,
—=-P3 + IP-l-A=0
which is a very simple looking production function P (I, A). But it suffices as an ap-
proximation11 to estabhsh the crucial point: Such a production process, where the
parameter I and A depend on control variables E and R that have gone offbalance, is struc-
turally unstable,
Structural instability - in this particular model of a production process - comes in by
way of a Splitting variable; I in this case: innovative investment can either expand or inten-
sify the process, and if I (E, R) develops over time such that with increasing R there is only
constant or even decreasing E, then innovative investments become critically one-sided. As
I enters as a parameter to the quadratic terms ofV (P, I, A), it produces a bifurcation set in
the (A, I) plane (see Figure 3).
This bifurcation set is defined as a set of points (A, I) which are such parameter con-
stellations that for aü points (A, I) in this set,
1) V (P, A, I) has turning points (the second order derivative vanishes) and
2) V (P, A, I) has two maxima P (A, I), so that over the bifurcation set the production func¬
tion is folded.
Consequently, under stress or disturbance, such a structuraüy unstable process can
yield high or low output P with the same input (A, I) or may squeeze out a whole ränge of
inputs without much drop in output. In dynamical terms, either or both may happen if the
time path of points (A, I) - see Figure 3 - passes over the lower bound ofthe bifurcation set.
In the post-war years 1920/1921, this break-down Situation in the US industry may just
have approached this limit of stress endurance; but the System seems to have absorbed the
post-war adjustment disturbances. In the years 1921/1931 the socio-economic system of
the US might weh already have become so inelastic that it could not take the exogenous
shocks which came from overseas from Europe and Latin America - needless to say, partly
by way of feedback to American crisis management (protectionism, monetary pohcy,
etc.12). For German data see Figure 4.
11 The correlation coefficient between A and I (-0.0919) and between A and P (-0.002) is about zero (no auto-
correlation), but the correlation coefficient between P computed as P (A, I) and P observed is nearly one
(0.9776). Hence, our production function is both meaningful and a good approximation ofthe empirical facts.
12 Acknowledgement: This analysis draws heavily from catastrophy theory as developed by R. Thom, Stabilite
Structurelle et Morphogenese, Reading, Mass.: W. A. Benjamin, Inc., 1972.
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Figure 3: USA 1900-1941, A,I input
/4- Average weekly working hours of employees
In manufacturing EIQ1* man hoursl
I ~ Private domestic Investment in producer
durable equipment CIO # c.p^
Source: see Table 2
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Figure 4: Germany 1925-1938, A,I input
A» Average weekly workmg hours in
German industry CIO* manhoursl
I » Gross Investment in Plant and Machinery In
German industry CIO9 mark c.p.1
1938
Source: W.G.Hoffmann u.a., Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft seit der Mitte des 19.Jahrhunderts,
Berlin usw. 1965, S.206, 214, 247
Thus, we have arrived at a real-economic explanation of the world economic crisis and
Great Depression which is analyticaUy at least as profound as the monetarist model of
depression. If a socio-economic system is sufficiently destabüized by an imbalanced
process of change, a number of things may happen; one possibility is breakdown such (as
in Figure 3) that employment and investment sink far below the "upper-level equüibrium
ränge".
b) A model of Radical Change
Another alternative, and by no means one that excludes the possibility of breakdown, is
that structural instability is gradually overcome by another stabilizer, which, given the
prior technological change imbalance, could conceivably come in by a sharp reversal of
the E/R-ratio.
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Figure 5: ER-ratio at the occasion of Clusters of Basic innovations around
1825, 1876, 1935
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Structural instability always implies structural readiness for radical change, for example,
change in the form of basic innovations as have occurred in a grape-clustering fashion in
the years around 1935; a number of examples of new industries that emerged at the end of
the Great Depression have been mentioned above. No wonder why in Chinese scriptures
the Kanji Stands both for crisis and opportunity. Thus, we have also arrived at some real-
economic explanation of the recovery from the Great Depression - again by drawing on
the evolutionary interplay between Stagnation and innovation.
A Cluster of basic innovations in a period of technological stalemate and depression always
implies a drastic upward movement of the E/R-ratio (proposition P3, sentence A) and we
have observed such step-ups in the years around 1825, around 1886, and around 1935 (see
Figure 5).
A very complementary Observation on the step-up of the ratio of "product-adding" ver¬
sus "product-replacing" during the time in question, the reader finds in the earliest articles
of Vladimir Stoikov, our late colleague of UM, Berlin13.
13 Stokov, Vladimir, The Classification ofInventions:A Sample Study\ in: The Southern Economic Journal, 29
(1962/63), pp. 15-20; derselbe, A Note on Product-Adding versus Product-Replacing Innovations, in:
Kyklos, XVI (1963), pp. 138-140.
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III. Summary
This paper attempts to explain the Coming and going ofthe Great Depression purely in real-
economic terms by exhibiting some long-run regularities in the evolutionary interplay
between innovation and Stagnation. This interplay seems to go through long-range cycies
of structural change.
According to our propositions, Stagnation is the result of imbalanced technological
change: for too many years there were too many rationahzing (R) innovations and too few
expansionary (E) innovations. As the E/R ratio becomes too low, the socio-economic
system becomes structuraüy unstable (crisis) and structurally ready (recovery) for a new
spurt of basic innovations and a good many expansionary changes.
Zusammenfassung: Das technologische Patt, 1925-1935:
Der Zusammenhang von Stagnation und Innovation.
Diese Studie versucht, das Kommen und Gehen der „Großen Depression" auf realökono¬
mische Weise zu erklären, und zwar durch die Darlegung langfristiger Regelmäßigkeiten
in der Wechselwirkung zwischen Innovation und Stagnation. Diese Wechselwirkung
scheint langfristigen Zyklen strukturellen Wandels zu unterhegen.
Nach unserer Sicht, die schon in Ricardos Essay „On Machinery" zu finden ist, ist Sta¬
gnation das Ergebnis emes Ungleichgewichts zwischen Arten des technologischen Wan¬
deis. Zu lange Jahre hat es zuviele rationalisierend wirkende (R) und zuwenig expansiv wir¬
kende (E) Innovationen gegeben. Wenn das Verhältnis von E/R zu niedrig wird, führt dies
zur Destabüisierung der sozioökonomischen Struktur (Krisenneigung). Die Wirtschaft
wird in dieser Stagnationsphase aber auch strukturell bereit für expansiv wirkende Basis¬
innovationen, die mit großen technischen und organisatorischen Veränderungen einher¬
gehen.
So lassen sich die Stagnation in den zwanziger Jahren und der Schub von Basisinnovatio¬
nen in den dreißiger Jahren auf einen Nenner bringen.
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